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Abstract
We consider a framework featuring a central bank, private and financial agents
as well as a financial market. The central bank’s objective is to maximize a func-
tional, which measures the classical trade-off between output and inflation plus
income from the sales of inflation linked calls minus payments for the liabilities
that the inflation linked calls produce at maturity. Private agents have rational
expectations and financial agents are averse against inflation risk. Following this
route, we explain demand for inflation linked calls on the financial market from
a no-arbitrage assumption and derive pricing formulas for inflation linked calls,
which lead to a supply-demand equilibrium. We then study the consequences that
the sales of inflation linked calls have on the observed inflation rate and price
level. Similar as in Walsh (1995) we find that the inflationary bias is significantly
reduced, and hence that markets for inflation linked calls provide a mechanism
to implement inflation contracts as discussed in the classical literature.
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1 Introduction
Inflation contracts have been widely discussed in the macro-economic and monetary
policy literature. In principal agent manner, the central banker is offered a compen-
sation, which depends on the realized inflation level. This approach was developed
by Persson and Tabellini (1993) as well as Walsh (1995) and shown to be a useful
device in order to remove inflationary bias, and in this way raise general welfare. The
contracts approach was further discussed in Svensson (1997) and Muscatelli (1999),
and put into relation with the concept of inflation targeting. Muscatelli highlighted
some advantages of the contracts approach as compared to the inflation targeting
approach, in the context of uncertainties in preferences and output targets.
The contracts proposed by Persson and Tabellini (1993) and Walsh (1995) are
between the government acting as a principal and the central banker as an agent.
In this note we show that this principal agent relationship is not required, and that
financial markets for inflation indexed securities can reduce inflationary bias in the
same way as the inflationary contracts discussed in the classical literature. Rather
than forcing the central banker to enter an inflation contract with the government, we
allow the central banker to sell inflation contracts in form of inflation linked calls to
financial agents. The central banker can choose the quantity of contracts placed on the
market and in this way determines the supply. Demand is mainly determined by the
financial agents’ level of risk aversion toward inflationary risk and their expectations
about the central banks inflation policy. The type of contract proposed in this article is
realistic, in fact, according to Deacon et al. (2004) no less than 27% of UK government
debt is inflation indexed and treasury inflation protected securities (TIPS) issued by
the US Treasury contain as their final payment an inflation linked call.
The model that we present is a full general equilibrium model, in which quantity
and price of the inflation linked calls is determined by equating supply and demand,
and private as well as financial agents reflect rational expectations in their inflation
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forecast. In this latter aspect, the current article differs structurally form Ewald and
Geissler (2013), who assumed adaptive expectations (as well as a different contract
structure). The supply side is modeled in analogy with Walsh (1995) and most of
the other inflation contract literature, with the difference that the inflation contract
is replaced by a quantity of inflation linked calls, which the central bank can choose.
The demand side is modeled in analogy to Black-Scholes, assuming that the price level
follows a geometric Brownian motion, whose drift rate is the inflation level chosen by
the central bank.
While the identification of markets for inflation linked securities as a Walsh (1995)
like mechanism contributes to the economic literature, our results also contribute to
the financial literature. Almost all of the classical financial literature on pricing of
inflation indexed securities takes inflation as exogenously given, and applies standard
Black-Scholes type theory or the Heath-Jarrow-Morton approach to term structure
modeling in order to develop pricing formulas, see for example Deacon et al. (2004)
and Jarrow and Yilderim (2003). These models ignore the central bank’s role in
issuing inflation indexed securities and the feedback effects on monetary policy this
has. To the best of our knowledge, this article presents the first pricing formulas
for inflation linked calls in which monetary policy is integrated within a full general
equilibrium framework.
2 Central Bank’s Supply of Inflation Linked Calls
An inflation linked call issued at time s with strike K˜ and maturity T is a financial
derivative that pays off nominal
(
PT
Ps
− K˜
)+
=
(
epi(T−s) − eK(T−s)
)+
:= max
(
epi(T−s) − eK(T−s), 0
)
(1)
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at maturity time T . Here we have set K = 1T−s log(K˜). Deacon, Derry and Mirfed-
ereski (2004) present an excellent overview about all types of traded inflation indexed
securities. Here Pt denotes the price level at time t and pi denotes the average in-
stantaneous inflation rate over time T − s. We consider a simplistic setup, in which
the central bank can issue inflation linked calls at time s = 0 which mature at time
T = 1. Denoting log-output with y, natural log-output with yn and a target value
with k, the classic quadratic loss function of the central bank has to be modified in
the following way
ZCB :=
1
2
[
λ (y − yn − k)2 + pi2
]
+N · d
[(
epi − eK)+ − p] , (2)
in order to take account of the central bank’s profits from the sales of inflation linked
calls. Here p denotes the price of one inflation linked call andN the number of inflation
linked calls issued by the central bank. The factor d is a weight and measures the
contribution of the financial position of the central bank in relations to its output
and inflation objectives. Expression (2) is of similar type as expressions (6) and (7)
in Muscatelli (1999), which include a penalty function and an exogenously defined
inflation contract instead of the profits from inflation linked call sales. However, in
contrast to Muscatelli and all other literature, in our case the price p and the quantity
N , and as such the inflation contract itself will be determined endogenously within
the model, via the financial market modeled in the next section.
As in the classical literature we assume that output is given by a Lucas-type
aggregate supply function of the form
y = yn + a(pi − pie) + ε, (3)
with a being the slope of the Phillips curve, pie expected inflation and ε a stochastic
shock to the economy with zero mean under the central bank’s measure. We assume
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in the following that  ∼ N (0, σ).1
We assume that the central bank is able to observe the economy shock ε, but
private agents are not.2 This means that the central bank’s inflation policy can
depend on ε, i.e. pi = pi(), while private agents’ expectations must not. Substitution
of (3) into (2) and taking expectations gives
V := E
{
1
2
λ [a (pi − pie) + − k]2 + 1
2
pi2 +N · d
[(
epi − eK)+ − p]} . (4)
The quantity N and price p of inflation linked calls will be determined in full
equilibrium in section 4. For given N and p we will now compute the central bank’s
optimal inflation policy. To stress that this policy in general depends on N we write
pi(N) in the following. We will later look for a rational expectation equilibrium, where
pie = E(pi), and as pi depends on N , so will pie. Hence we will include N in the notation
for the expected inflation rate as well, and assume for the moment that pie = pie(N)
is given.
Proposition 1. The central bank’s optimal choice for the inflation rate pi(N) as a
function of the shock ε is given by
pi∗(N, ε) =
{ ξ(N, ε) if ε ≥ η(N)
K if θ(N) ≤ ε ≤ η(N)
ψ(N, ε) if ε ≤ θ(N),
1For a more general discussion on noise, please compare Sun et al. (2010a,b) as well as Li and Jin
(2012)
2In a more dynamic version of the model private agents would observe the economy shock with a
time delay. How to deal with time delay conceptually is discussed in Sun et al. (2014) and Sun et
al. (2015)
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where
ξ(N, ε) :=
a2λpie(N) + aλk
1 + a2λ
− aλε
1 + a2λ
ψ(N, ε) := ξ(N, ε)− 1
T − sW
(
dN(T − s)2eξ(N,ε)(T−s)
1 + a2λ
)
and
η(N) := apie(N) + k − (1 + a
2λ)K
aλ
θ(N) := η(N)− dN(T − s)e
K(T−s)
aλ
.
Here W denotes the Lambert W-function, compare Abramowitz and Stegun (1965).
Proof. To find the optimal pi∗(N, ), we can carry out the minimization of (4) point-
wise for each  inside the expectation. Also note that p in (4) can be treated as
an additive constant and as such can be ignored in the minimization. We omit the
arguments N and  from pi, pie, ξ and ψ and denote
V1 =
1
2
λ(a(pi − pie) + ε− k)2 + 1
2
pi2 + dN
(
epi(T−s) − eK(T−s)
)+
,
V2 =
1
2
λ(a(pi − pie) + ε− k)2 + 1
2
pi2,
V3 =
1
2
λ(a(pi − pie) + ε− k)2 + 1
2
pi2 + dN
(
epi(T−s) − eK(T−s)
)
.
Note that V1 corresponds to V , while V2 respectively V3 correspond to the two cases
where the inflation linked call is not exercised respectively exercised. Verifying the
first order conditions for V2 and V3 it can easily be seen that ξ minimizes V2, while ψ
minimizes V3. Therefore, by Lemma 1 following below, the optimal choice pi
∗ for V1
is ξ if ξ ≤ K and ψ if ψ ≥ K. If the shock is such that ψ ≤ K ≤ ξ (or alternatively
θ(N) ≤  ≤ η(N)) the first statement in Lemma 1 lets us conclude that pi∗ ≥ K
while the second statement lets us conclude that pi∗ ≤ K, which together implies
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pi∗ = K.
Lemma 1. Let V1, V2 and V3 be the functions defined in the proof of Proposition 1.
1. V1 attains its minimum for some pi < K if and only if V2 attains its minimum
for that particular pi.
2. V1 attains its minimum for some pi > K if and only if V3 attains its minimum
for that particular pi.
Proof. First note that all three functions V1, V2 and V3 are convex in pi for λ > − 1a2 .
This can be easily verified from the second order derivatives of the corresponding
functions. We assume λ > − 1
a2
in the following. Therefore each function has exactly
one global minimum and no local maximum. As it is easy to check ξ minimizes V2,
while ψ minimizes V3. In particular we see that V2 is always minimized for larger
values of pi than V3 and therefore there is no inconsistency in the conditions above.
For the first statement note that V2(pi) ≤ V1(pi) with equality for all pi ≤ K.
Hence if V2 is minimal for some pi
∗ ≤ K then V1 is also minimal for pi∗. For the
inverse implication suppose there is some pi∗ < K minimizing V1. Then there exists
an ε > 0 such that V2(pi) = V1(pi) for all pi ≤ pi∗ + ε. Hence pi∗ minimizes V2 over the
interval (−∞, pi∗ + ε] and by the above convexity argument we know that it is the
unique global minimum of V2.
The second statement can be shown analogously using V3(pi) ≤ V1(pi) with equality
for all pi ≥ K, whilst for the inverse implication we use the convexity of V3(pi).
So far we have established how the central bank would optimally choose the infla-
tion rate given a specific number of inflation linked calls it has issued, the announced
private agent’s expected inflation rate pie and the economy shock ε. Let us now
consider how private agents build their expectations in this modified setup. While
private agents do not know the outcome of the economy shock, we do assume that
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they know its distribution. This assumption differs from Walsh (1995), where the
linear nature of the contract permits, that private agents only have to know that the
shock is neutral, i.e. does have expectation zero. As indicated earlier, we assume that
private agents have rational expectations, i.e. pie(N) = E(pi(N)). Using Proposition
1 we obtain
pie(N) = P(ε ≥ η(N))E(ξ(N)|ε ≥ η(N)) + P(θ(N) ≤ ε ≤ η(N))K
+ P(ε ≤ θ(N))E(ψ(N)|ε ≤ θ(N)). (5)
Note that the right hand side of (5) depends on pie(N) through ξ(N), ψ(N), θ(N)
and η(N) and in fact represents a fixed point equation. The fact that ε is normally
distributed allows in principle to write down and compute the expectations on the
right hand side, however it remains impossible to solve for pie. For the general case
this has to be done by an iterative procedure, which we carried out in order to obtain
our numerical results.
If N = 0, i.e. no inflation linked calls are issued by the central bank, the objective
function (4) is identical with the classical quadratic loss function, and we should
obtain the classical results pi = pi(0, ) = aλk −
(
aλ
1+a2λ
)
 and pie = pie(0) = aλk.
This is confirmed in the following remark
Remark 1. For the case N = 0, in which no inflation linked calls are issued, we find
that ξ(0) and ψ(0) coincide and so do θ(0) and η(0). Hence the middle summand in
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(5) vanishes and therefore, omitting all arguments N = 0, we find that
pie =P(ε ≥ η)E(ξ|ε ≥ η) + P(ε ≤ η)E(ξ|ε ≤ η)
=
∫ ∞
η
ξ(ε)dP(ε) +
∫ η
−∞
ξ(ε)dP(ε)
=
a2λpie + aλk
1 + a2λ
− aλEε
1 + a2λ
.
=
a2λpie + aλk
1 + a2λ
.
The last equality results from the fact that the shock has zero mean. Hence as in
the classical case without inflation linked calls we obtain that pie = aλk. Substitution
into the expressions for ξ and ψ in Proposition 1 then gives pi() = ξ() = ψ() =
aλk −
(
aλ
1+a2λ
)
, which is the classical result.
We will see though in section 5, that N = 0 is in general far from optimal, and
that there will be positive demand N > 0 for inflation linked calls on the financial
market.
3 Demand for Inflation Linked Calls on Financial Mar-
kets
The financial market in our model features a safe asset paying a nominal interest
rate ri as well as inflation linked calls as defined in the previous section. Demand for
inflation linked calls arises from our assumption that financial agents are risk averse
towards inflation. This aversion is expressed in an inflation risk premium, which
manifests itself in the use of an appropriate risk neutral measure. Financial agents
buy inflation linked calls in order to reduce/eliminate their exposure to inflationary
risk. As indicated earlier, we assume that ε ∼ N (0, σ) under the central bank’s
measure P. For the market to be arbitrage free, the price p = p(N) of one inflation
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linked call has to satisfy
p(N) =e−riE˜
(
epi(N) − eK
)+
, (6)
where E˜ denotes the expectation under a risk-neutral pricing measure P˜. In differ-
ence to say a call option on a stock, the price level as such is not tradeable, as the
consumption good is assumed to be perishable. This has the consequence that a risk
neutral measure is not unique. We assume that financial agents are averse toward
inflation risk and attach a specific risk premium to the economy shock in the following
way. We write  = σ · w with w ∼ N (0, 1) under P. The measure transformation
leading to the risk neutral measure is then as follows: w˜ = w + χ with w˜ ∼ N (0, 1)
under P˜ and
 = σ (w˜ − χ) , (7)
where χ represents the market price of economy risk. We then have that ε ∼
N (−σ · χ, σ2) under P˜. Identifying w with the realization of a Brownian motion at
time t = 1, this transformation can be identified as Girsanov transformation, which
is used in classical Black-Scholes theory to determine the risk-neutral measure.
4 General Equilibrium with Inflation Linked Calls
Our framework involves three players, the central bank, private agents and financial
agents. These have been discussed separately within the previous sections. Obviously
their decisions are linked with each other. Private agents can infer on the actual
number N of inflation linked calls sold by the central bank as well as financial agent’s
objectives to build their expectations pie, while the central bank depends on pie and
N in order to determine pi(N) and p and financial agents depend on pie in order to
determine their demand for inflation linked calls p(N).
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Proposition 2. A general equilibrium (p∗, N∗, pi∗, pi∗e) of our model consisting of
price p∗ for one inflation linked call, a quantity N∗ of inflation linked calls issued,
actual inflation pi∗ and expected inflation pi∗e is determined by the following conditions
p∗ = p(N∗) where the right hand side is given by (6)
pi∗ = pi∗(N∗) with pi∗(N) given by Proposition 1
pi∗e = pie(N∗) with pie(N) satisfying equation (5)
N∗ = arg min
N
{
1
2
λE(a(pi(N)− pie(N)) + ε− k)2 + 1
2
Epi(N)2 + dN(M(N)− p∗)
}
with pi(N) given by Proposition 1 and pie(N) satisfying equation (5).
Proof. This follows directly from the results obtained in sections 2 and 3.
In Proposition 2 arg minN denotes the minimizer of the expression in the pointy
brackets. In order to compute the equilibrium in Proposition 2, we need to solve
equation (5) numerically for a discrete grid of values of N and work from there
through the other conditions.
It can be concluded from (5) as well as the definition of ξ(N), ψ(N), η(N) and
θ(N) and the properties of the Lambert W-function that the solution pie(N) of (5) is
decreasing in N . In particular, if inflation linked calls are issued pi∗e will be lower than
aλk, the expected inflation without a market for inflation linked calls. If the strike
price K of the inflation linked calls is not chosen to high, p(N) in equation (6) will be
strictly positive and hence demand for inflation linked calls from financial agents will
exist. It then becomes evident from (4) that the central bank, by issuing a positive
number of inflation linked calls can improve its objective function V as compared to
the case without inflation linked calls. Hence our analysis shows that all three players,
central bank, private agents and financial agents improve their position as compared
to the case when N = 0. Therefore the existence of a market for inflation linked calls
leads to a Pareto improvement as compared to the classical case, and inflationary bias
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is significantly reduced. Table 1 summarizes these conclusions.
N > 0
private agents inflation decreasing
central bank value V increasing
financial agents reducing inflationary risk
Table 1: Benefits from inflation linked calls.
5 Numerical Results
In this section we provide a short numerical experiment. We choose the following
set of parameters as introduced in sections 2 and 3: K = 0.02, σ = 0.09, ri = 0.05,
χ = 13 , a = 3, k = 0.15, λ =
1
9 and d = 10
−11. The expected inflation rate in the
classical model without inflation linked calls is then given by pie = aλk = 0.05.
As seen in Figure 1, the expected inflation rate with inflation linked calls is a
decreasing function in N and turns out to be less than the strike K = 0.02 for
N ≈ 6× 1011.
Figure 1: The expected inflation rate is decreasing in the number N of inflation linked
calls that the central bank sells.
Knowing pie(N) it is possible to compute the corresponding expected payoff for
the inflation linked calls. The inverse demand function p(N) for inflation linked
calls is given by (6). This equation determines the number N the central bank can
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issue on the market, when choosing a particular price. A numerical computation,
as indicated in section 3, then shows that the number of inflation linked calls issued
in equilibrium by the central bank is N ≈ 5.25 × 1011 for an equilibrium price of
p ≈ 0.001925 per inflation linked call. Private agents’ rationale expectation for the
inflation rate in this example is then reduced from 5% without inflation linked calls
to pie ≈ 0.02067 = 2.067% with inflation linked calls, which can also be observed from
Figure 1.
6 Conclusions
We have studied the effects of markets for inflation linked calls on the central bank’s
monetary policy. We presented a model featuring a central bank, private and financial
agents as well as a financial market, in which the central bank can adjust inflation
and in addition can issue inflation linked calls, which it sells on the financial market.
Within this models we have derived equilibrium prices and quantity for the inflation
linked calls issued. Our model features rational expectations for the private agents.
We have shown, that the introduction of inflation linked calls can reduce the central
bank’s inflationary bias, and that central bank, private agents as well as financial
agents in our model are better off with inflation linked calls than without. In this
way inflation linked calls should be seen as effective and powerful monetary policy
instruments, which can implement the sort of inflation contracts discussed in the
classical literature, without the requirement of a classical principal agent relationship
between government and central bank.
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